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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. West appeals from his judgment of conviction for intimidating a witness pursuant to
Idaho Code § 18-2604(3), arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
because there was no evidence the person he allegedly intimidated was a witness, a person who
may be called as a witness, or a person who Mr. West believed may be called as a witness, in a
criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing. The State argues the result in this case is
controlled by State v. Curry, 153 Idaho 394 (Ct. App. 2012). (Respondent's Br., pp.6-12.)
Mr. West submits this Reply Briefto argue the Curry Court's discussion of§ 18-2604(3) is dicta,
and does not control the result here. If this Court agrees, it should reject the Curry Court's
reasoning, and hold, under the plain language of the statute, that a defendant cannot be liable for
intimidating a witness by threatening harm to a person if she calls the police to report an alleged
assault in the absence of any pending criminal proceeding. If this Court concludes the Curry
Court's statutory analysis is not dicta, it should overrule this portion of Curry as it reflects an
improper (and never previously relied upon) interpretation of State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108
(2006).

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. West included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant's
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant's Br., pp.1-4.) He includes this
section only to address the State's factual assertions regarding Mr. West's use of a gun. (See
Respondent's Br., pp.1-3.) The State asserts Mr. West "grabbed the gun" and "put the gun to
[Breanna Phillips'] face (touching her right cheek with it)." (Respondent's Br., p.2.) To be clear,
this is what Ms. Phillips testified to at trial, but it is not what happened. The jury found Mr. West

1

not guilty of aggravated assault and felon in possession of a firearm. (R., pp.121-25.) This means

the jury did not accept Ms. Phillips' story as true. Mr. West and Ms. Phillips were involved in an
altercation regarding a set of keys on the morning of July 19, 2017, but no weapon was involved.
(See generally Appellant's Br., pp.2-3.)

2

ISSUE
Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. West's conviction for intimidating a witness?
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ARGUMENT
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. West's Conviction For Intimidating A Witness

A.

Introduction
Mr. West argued in his Appellant's Brief that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for intimidating a witness pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-2604(3), because there was no
evidence that the person he allegedly intimidated, Breanna Phillips, was a witness, a person who
may be called as a witness, or a person who Mr. West believed may be called as a witness, in a
criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Br., pp.6-10.) Mr. West argued
the State's theory of the case-that he was guilty of intimidating a witness because he
intimidated Ms. Phillips from reporting an alleged assault to the police, on the theory the assault
might lead to a criminal proceeding at which Ms. Phillips might testify-was not a proper theory
ofliability under§ 18-2604(3). (Id.)
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues the result in this case is controlled by State v.
Curry, 153 Idaho 394 (Ct. App. 2012), where, according to the State, "the Idaho Court of

Appeals specifically held that no pending criminal proceeding was required [for the crime of
felony intimidating a witness]." 1 (Respondent's Br., p.6.) The State in incorrect, because the
statutory "holding" it purports to rely upon from Curry was not necessary to decide the issue
presented in that case, and is thus dicta. See State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74 (2013) ("If the
statement is not necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court, it is considered to
be dictum and not controlling.") (citation omitted).

1

Mr. West cited Curry in its Appellant's Brief, but argued the relevant portion of the decision
was dicta and represented a misinterpretation of Mercer. (Appellant's Br., p.9, note 1.)
4

If this Court agrees with Mr. West's reading of Cuny, it should reject the Curry Court's

statutory analysis, and hold, under the plain language of§ 18-2604(3), that Mr. West cannot be
liable for felony intimidating a witness. If this Court concludes the Curry Court's statutory
analysis is not dicta, it should overrule this portion of Curry as it reflects an improper (and never
previously relied upon) interpretation of State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108 (2006).

B.

The Curry Court's Interpretation Ofldaho Code § 18-2604(3) Was Not Essential To The
Court's Decision, And Is Thus Dicta
In State v. Curry, the Court of Appeals held, among other things, that there was

insufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for burglary and aggravated assault.
153 Idaho at 403-04. The State had charged the defendant with burglary for entering into a
garage "with the intent to commit the crime of witness intimidation and/or aggravated assault"
and with aggravated assault. 2 Id. at 396. The State argued on appeal that there was "sufficient
evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that Curry entered the garage with the
necessary intent for burglary (either the intent to intimidate Ferra or to commit aggravated
assault [on Escudero])" and to find that the defendant committed aggravated assault by using a
deadly weapon during the commission of the assault on Escudero. Id. at 397.
The Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument. With respect to the burglary
conviction, the Court engaged in a brief discussion of§ 18-2604(3), citing only to the statute and
State v. Mercer, and said that "[w ]hether a criminal proceeding was pending is irrelevant to
whether Curry entered the garage with the intent to intimidate a witness" because "if a defendant
believes a witness may testify in the future at a criminal proceeding he believes may ensue and
intimidates that witness ... his guilt does not tum on whether a criminal proceeding has already
2

Notably, the State did not charge the defendant in Curry with the crime of witness intimidation.
See Curry, 153 Idaho at 396.
5

been formally initiated." Id. at 398. The Court went on to hold that there was insufficient
evidence to support the defendant's burglary conviction based on witness intimidation because
there was insufficient evidence that, at the time he entered the garage, the defendant attempted to
intimidate Ferra. Id. at 398-99. The Court further held, after a lengthy discussion, that there was
insufficient evidence that the defendant committed an assault with a deadly weapon against
Escudero, and thus insufficient evidence to support either the State's alternative theory for the
burglary conviction or the aggravated assault conviction. Id. at 399-403.
In looking at the Court's decision in Curry, it is clear that the Court's brief discussion of
Idaho Code § 18-2604(3) was not necessary to decide the issue presented to the Court, which
was whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's burglary and aggravated
assault convictions, and was thus dicta. See Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 74. Judicial dictum is defined
in Black's Law Dictionary as "[a]n opinion on a question that is directly involved, briefed, and
argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is not essential to the decision and
therefore not binding even if it may later be accorded some weight." Dictum, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Considering this definition, the fact that the Court of Appeals
passed on the meaning of§ 18-2604(3) does not make its interpretation of the statute binding, as
its interpretation was not essential to its decision.
Tellingly, Curry has been cited in three subsequent court decisions, but none of those
decisions involve the interpretation of§ 18-2604(3). See State v. Elias, No. 39139, 2013 WL
3480737, at *1 (Ct. App. July 12, 2013), ajf'd, 157 Idaho 511 (2014) (citing Curry for the
standard of review for a claim of sufficiency of the evidence); State v. Haight, No. 39701, 2013
WL 5988267, at *2 (Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2013) (same); see also Noe v. Commonwealth, No. 2017SC-000326-MR, 2018 WL 5732312, at *4 (Ky. Nov. 1, 2018) (citing Curry for its discussion of
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the amount of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence that
places a deadly weapon at the scene of a crime). Curry is also not cited in the comments to the
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction on intimidating a witness. See ICJI 1266 (citing State v.
Anderson, 144 Idaho 713 (2007), and State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108 (2006)). The question
presented in this case is not controlled by Curry.

C.

If This Court Agrees With Mr. West's Reading Of Curry, It Should Reject The Curry
Court's Statutory Analysis, And Hold Mr. West Cannot Be Liable For Felony
Intimidating A Witness

Idaho Code § 18-2604(3) defines the crime of intimidating a witness as follows:
Any person who, by direct or indirect force, or by any threats to person or
property, or by any manner willfully intimidates, influences, impedes, deters,
threatens, harasses, obstructs or prevents, a witness, including a child witness, or
any person who may be called as a witness or any person he believes may be
called as a witness in any criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing
from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in that criminal proceeding or juvenile
evidentiary hearing is guilty of a felony.
I.C. § 18-2604(3). The statute clearly states that, in order for liability to attach, a person must
intimidate "a witness . . . or any person who may be called as a witness or any person who
believes may be called at a witness in any criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing ..
. ." Id. The purpose of the statute is to ensure that witnesses can testify "freely, fully and

truthfully" in criminal proceedings and juvenile evidentiary hearings. By its plain language, the
statute does not criminalize intimidating a person from reporting a crime to the police, which is
(arguably) what Mr. West did here; rather, it criminalizes intimidating a witness or potential
witness from providing truthful testimony in a criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary
hearing.
In State v. Mercer, the Idaho Supreme Court held the plain language ofl.C. § 18-2604(3)
"does not require a defendant to actually prevent a potential witness from properly testifying."
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143 Idaho at 109. The Court explained "it is the defendant's actions combined with an intent to
intimidate in a criminal proceeding, not the effect on the witness, that constitutes the crime." Id.
at 110. The Court held "[t]he defendant must act with the intent of intimidating a witness 'from
testifying freely, fully and truthfully,' in a criminal proceeding" in order for liability to attach. Id.
The Court's holding in Mercer does not remove the requirement of a pending criminal
proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing. Instead, Mercer makes clear that the State does not
have to prove, as an element of the offense, that the witness actually perjured himself or herself
(i.e., the witness intimidation does not have to be successful).

The State argues in its Respondent's Brief that its reading of§ 18-2604(3) is supported
by State v. Crider, 487 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio App. 1984). (Respondent's Br., pp.10-11.) But the
statute at issue in Crider is clearly distinguishable from LC. § 18-2604(3). In Crider, the Court of
Appeals for Ohio held the defendant could be guilty of burglary based upon the underlying
felony of intimidation ofa witness in violation ofR.C. 2921.03, where the statute provided at the
time that "[n Jo person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of harm, shall attempt to
influence, intimidate, or hinder a ... witness in the discharge of his duty." Crider, 487 N.E.2d at
912 (quotation marks omitted, ellipses in original). The Ohio statute makes no mention of a
criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing, and does not refer to providing testimony.
Under the plain language of§ 18-2604(3), Mr. West cannot be liable for intimidating a
witness where, as the State concedes, there was no evidence the person he allegedly intimidated
was a witness, a person who may be called as a witness, or a person who Mr. West believed may
be called as a witness, in a pending criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing.
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D.

If This Court Concludes The Curry Court's Statutory Analysis Is Not Dicta, It Should
Overrule This Portion Of Curry As It Is Inconsistent With The Plain Language Of The
Statute And Reflects An Improper Interpretation Of State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108
(2006)
If this Court agrees with the State that the Curry Court's brief discussion of§ 18-2604(3)

is not dicta, it should overrule this portion of Curry as it is inconsistent with the plain language
of the statute, as discussed above, and reflects an improper interpretation of Mercer.
In discussing LC. § 18-2604(3), the Curry Court cited only to the statute and State v.
Mercer. See Curry, 153 Idaho at 398. The Court of Appeals' analysis consisted of only a single

sentence: "In accord with the broad wording in the statute and this Court's previous
interpretation, if a defendant believes a witness may testify in the future at a criminal proceeding
he believes may ensue and intimidates that witness in violation of this statute, his guilt does not
tum on whether a criminal proceeding has already been formally initiated." Id. As explained
above, the requirement of a pending criminal proceeding or juvenile evidentiary hearing was not
eliminated by the Court in Mercer. Under Mercer, "[t]he defendant must act with the intent of
intimidating a witness 'from testifying freely, fully and truthfully,' in a criminal proceeding" in
order for liability to attach. 143 Idaho at 110. Where, as here, there is no pending criminal
proceeding, and the defendant allegedly intimidates a person from reporting a crime as opposed
to providing testimony, the defendant cannot, as a matter of law, bue liable for intimidating a
witness pursuant to § 18-2604(3).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. West
respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction for intimidating a witness, and remand
this case to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 23 rd day of October, 2019.

I sf Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 rd day of October, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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